We build a unique industry-level panel data set to estimate border effects with respect to U.S.-Canada trade for each year from 1992 to 2005. Estimates from data aggregated at the province/state level yield border effects in the early 1990s that increase slightly and then decline after the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), but significantly increase after 2001. Results based on three digit NAICS level data reveal higher border effects in the early 1990s and considerable heterogeneity across industries. These results imply that the tragic events of 9/11 had considerable adverse impacts for U.S.-Canada trade.
Introduction
A persistent and extremely surprising empirical result in the international trade literature is the existence of rather strong 'border effects. ' The conundrum consists of the fact that intra-national trade is typically found to be a multiple of international trade, even after controlling for a diverse array of barriers such as distance, economic size, explicit trade obstacles and a host of other country specific characteristics, such as common language, persistence and variability of border effects across sectors, and to control for potentially confounding year specific shocks. Exclusive reliance on aggregate trade effectively imposes a uniform response not only of province-state pairs, but also across trading sectors of the two economies. Perhaps more importantly, the time span of these data allows us to evaluate the effects of two significant shocks that theoretically should have impacted the magnitude of border effects between Canada and the United States. Specifically, the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the increase in border security in the aftermath of the tragic September 11, 2001 (or 9/11) events.
Why do we see any significant border effects at all? As noted by Goldfarb (2007) , an obvious consequence of enhanced border security is longer and less predictable waiting times, which contributes to increased expenditures on variable inputs such as fuel and drivers hours, as well as more rapid depreciation of trucks and related capital equipment. Manufacturers might respond to possible delays by increasing average inventory levels or by sending goods earlier in order to ensure timely arrival. Border delays are especially critical for perishable commodities. All else being equal, border delays increase the costs of international trade and enhances the attractiveness of domestic substitutes. The possibility of this resulting in lower trade is evident.
Exploiting the effects of NAFTA and 9/11 may shed some light on the source, economic nature and composition of border effects. For example, if non-tariff trade barriers are partly responsible for the border effects, then we expect to see a decrease after NAFTA, above and beyond the decrease recorded as a result of the 1988 Free Trade Agreement, which largely dismantled tariff barriers. On the other hand, there also exists some evidence of a 'September 11' effect in bilateral trade flows between Canada and the United States.
In the wake of the terrorist attacks on the United States, a series of measures aimed at tightening border security have been adopted, and these are largely considered to have led to a substantial border thickening and thereby to a slowing down, if not a reversal, of closer economic integration between Canada and the United States. Negotiations to speed up the flow of goods and people across the border are currently under way between Canada and the United States. The currently proposed security perimeter and regulatory cooperation agreement 2 is aimed at promoting trade, economic growth and jobs on both sides, while maintaining a high security level. These efforts are based on the belief that the border thickened. However, we are unaware of any existing empirical evidence of such impacts.
This paper aims to fill this void.
The raw data certainly exhibits features of both events. Based on data from twenty-five (three digit) NAICS level industries (predominantly in manufacturing), Figure 1 Canada border, considerably impacted trade flows between the two countries. We find pronounced border effects with respect to Canadian exports to the U.S. as well as for
Canadian imports from the United States. Finally, our estimates reveal some heterogeneity in border effects, that is, however, consistent with institutional details specific to each industry.
Methodology
Details on data compilation and sources are contained in the Appendix. To establish comparability with the literature, we first aggregate the data across sectors, by province-province and province-state trade flows. The basic empirical specification is the following gravity model:
where ln is the natural logarithm, i refers to the originating jurisdiction and j to the destination. T RADE ij represents total exports and imports between jurisdictions i and j, DUMP ROV ij is equal to 1 for interprovincial trade and 0 otherwise, GDP i (P OP i ) is total GDP (population) for jurisdiction i, GDP j (P OP j ) is total GDP (population) for jurisdiction j, DIST ij is total distance between jurisdictions i and j and ǫ ij is the error term. We use actual driving distances from Google maps, in addition to direct line distances, which have been the norm in the literature. This is arguably a superior proxy for transportation costs, since truck shipping is the mode of choice for a large proportion of Canada-U.S. trade.
The exponential of DUMP ROV ij yields the border effect. We run this regression separately for each year from 1992-2005. Each of these regressions will be based on a maximum of 690 annual observations consisting of 90 (10 x 9) observations for interprovincial trade and 600 (10 x 30 x 2) observations for province-state trade. 6 The dependent variable will take a value of zero in cases where there is no trade between any jurisdictions i and j. originating jurisdiction, in order to account for unobserved correlations that might impact trade flows specific to the jurisdiction.
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This is the standard approach used by studies that have relied on interprovincial and province-state trade flows. We augment this specification by also employing data on state to state trade flows. Therefore, the empirical specification becomes:
where DUMP ROV ij is equal to 1 for inter-provincial trade flows and is 0 otherwise, while While useful for assessing the overall magnitude of border resistance, the above methodologies do not allow to properly identify the source of the border effect and understand which industries are differentially impacted. Therefore, we run the specifications with three digit level NAICS data. Employing these data also enables us to use dummies for the orig- 7 The relevant summary statistics are provided in the Appendix, Table 1a . 8 The relevant summary statistics are provided in the Appendix, Table 2a . only record 'significant' flows of goods, which implies that a zero in the data may reflect either no trade or shipments, or trade and shipments below an arbitrary threshold. 9 Given this, the use of truncated regression models 10 are appropriate for estimating equations (1) and (2) when using three digit NAICS data. Summary statistics of these data are available in the Appendix, Table 3a. The first estimable framework then becomes:
if T RADE ijk > threshold and where k refers to the specific three digit NAICS indus- 9 Depending on the dataset used and according to the documentation obtained from the data provides, the truncation level with respect to trade flows in a particular industry is defined as equal to $100,000 for inter-provincial and province-states trade, and $1 million for state-state trade. 10 The Stata command truncreg uses the normality assumption of the entire population to fit a regression model using a sample drawn from the restricted part of the population. See e.g. Wooldridge (2003) , p. 579.
try. i P ROV i represents dummies for the originating province and k NAICS k refers to NAICS level dummies. Therefore, border effects are identified here by exploiting variation across trade flows between provinces and provinces to states, while holding constant unobserved shocks specific to an originating province and industry. In these regressions, standard errors of coefficient estimates are clustered by industry and the originating jurisdiction.
Empirical Estimates
3.1. Regressions based on aggregate provincial and state level trade flows Table 1 all columns) and have the expected negative signs. Population levels in the originating and destination jurisdictions are sporadically significant with no clear patterns. Table 2 are roughly 9, 17, and 16, respectively. All these coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. Coefficient estimates of interstate trade (INT ERST AT E ij ) are also significant at the 1% level across all columns with different signs. Origin and destination GDP are also significant across all columns with positive signs, and distance is negative and significant at the 1% level.
As expected, the estimates based on 1993 data parallel findings from . First, our border effect of 9.87 in column 1 is only slightly lower than their estimate of 10.7. Second, our estimate of the difference in interstate trade flows relative to province-state trade (INT ERST AT E ij ) is 1.75, which is only slightly larger than their result of 1.5. As a further sensitivity analysis, we re-ran the regressions in Tables   1 and 2 , but using difference -in -difference specifications that condition border effect estimates on unobserved time specific shocks through year specific dummies. Employing difference-in-difference models yields separate border effects for each year but also has the advantage of allowing us to employ province (state) and year fixed effects in order to control for unobserved shocks that are fixed within jurisdictions over time or simultaneously impact all provinces and states in a given year. Equation (1) thus becomes:
where the t subscript denotes the year. β 1 now yields the border effect for 1993 and the other coefficients (β 2 through β 13 ) measure the incremental border effect for each subsequent year. i ORIG i represents originating province dummies and t Y EAR t are year specific dummies. Equation (2) is also modified as:
β 4 is the benchmark effect for interstate flows for 1992 and the other coefficients (β 5 , β 6 ) measure the incremental impacts for each subsequent year. In both specifications, standard errors are clustered by origin and destination in order to account for unobserved jurisdictionlevel correlations. Table 3 contains OLS estimates of equations (4) and (5) Table 4 with those in Table 1 , accounting for remoteness does reduce the border effect by a modest, but not significant margin, which is again consistent with the literature.
A more comprehensive method in addressing the trading resistance factor in bilateral trade consists in controlling for multilateral resistance terms (MRTs). These are price indices which are functions of all bilateral trade barriers on both the exporter and the importer sides.
11 One method to account for 'trading resistance' assumes that the most important barrier to trade is distance itself, and attempts to control for the opportunity cost of trade using various indicators of the remoteness of both trading partners. are not observables, and the relatively involved numerical approximation and non-linear estimation procedure has led to a low rate of adoption of the method in subsequent papers.
VARIABLES
However, we acknowledge that controlling for the multilateral resistance terms is important for establishing the robustness of our results.
To this end we use a custom Stata program 12 , which solves the non-linear system analytically and has several advantages beyond user-friendliness over the original procedure.
The method yields a reduced form log-linear gravity equation which can be estimated using standard econometric techniques. The first column in Table 4a in the Appendix presents the summarized results using the Anderson and van Wincoop structural estimation procedure, while the second column is a comparable reduced form model, using origin and destination fixed effects. Comparing the two sets of results, it can be observed that, while this particular expression of the border coefficient 13 is reduced when controlling for the theoretically-sound multilateral resistance terms, the difference when compared to the simple OLS model including origin/destination dummies, is not substantial. 14 Hence, the differences between our jurisdiction-dummy estimations above and the theoretically-sound structural parameter estimates is not likely to be large. however, all of these zero flows will actually drop out of the industry-level sample. Consequently, the implied border effect may appear magnified. Therefore the extensive margin of trade and the effect of aggregation present a possible explanation for the difference.
Regressions based on NAICS level disaggregated data

Sources of Border Effects
In order to shed some more light on the source of border effects, we ran our simple baseline regression (equation 1) separately for imports and exports by and from Canadian provinces to the United States. Coefficient estimates of border effects are statistically significant (at the 1% level) with respect to both exports and imports. For the sake of brevity, we summarize the regression results in Figure 2 , which graphs the border effects over time.
Initially, border effects for Canadian exports are larger in magnitude. In contrast, border 15 Detailed results are available upon request. 16 As mentioned previously, Hillberry (2002) suggests the converse could be true. In contrast, we obtain larger effects when using disaggregated data. effects for imports exceed corresponding impacts for exports from the mid-1990s onwards.
However, border effects for both exports and imports closely parallel each other over time and are consistent with the broad trends outlined in the previous regressions. Specifically, there is a clear decline in border effects following NAFTA, succeeded by a post 9-11 increase.
In other words, firms on both sides of the border experienced similar costs. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate regression estimates (also based on a specification resembling equation (1)) for the 11 industries with the highest average border effects. 17 18 The results in figure 3 demonstrate considerable heterogeneity across industries. For example, food manufacturing has the highest border effect in the early 1990s, but then experienced a rapid decline during the mid and later part of the decade, probably because of the decline in tariffs generated by NAFTA. Further, there is no strong post 9-11 effect. In contrast, there is a significant spike in border effects for beverage and tobacco in the mid-1990s followed by a rather sharp decline and then a more or less constant trend until 9-11. These results are consistent with industry specific policies. In the early 1990s, Canadian cigarettes were extremely expensive relative to comparable U.S. products because of high excise taxes. 19 However, federal and provincial governments significantly reduced taxes during the mid-1990s in order to stop the flow of cross-border smuggling from the United States.
As a result, Canadian tobacco products became cheaper and attractive for U.S. importers. 17 The complete results are available upon request. Most of the border effects reported in figures 3 and 4 are statistically significant at either the 1% or 5% levels. On the other hand, border effects remained stable for much of the 1990s for petroleum products, which is unsurprising given the low tariffs on these products even before NAFTA.
However, a significant increase is visible post 9-11. This result does again correspond with our intuition. Retail demand for gasoline has to be met rapidly and any cross-border delays may be extremely expensive for refiners. Printing and the other industries in figure 4 demonstrate very similar results. In summary, there is evidence of a post NAFTA decline followed by a 9-11 increase in the restrictive effect of borders on trade flows. Table 6 The above discussion confirms that not all industries conform to the 'on-average' estimates of border effects in previous tables that suggest a post NAFTA dip succeeded by a subsequent 9-11 increase. However, border effects for these industries do seem to correspond with other institutional changes that occurred over the same time period. Moreover, results from the seven industries illustrated in figure 4 show that border effects for most industries are in fact consistent with our 'on-average' findings. In summary, this industry -specific analysis yields some further reassurance on the robustness of our findings and that they are not confounded by unobserved jurisdiction or year specific shocks.
Conclusion
The broad objective of our research is to shed some more light on the 'black box' of border effects in international trade flows between Canada and the U.S. Unlike most comparable time span of our data allows us to identify border effects through the enactment of NAFTA and the 9/11 terrorist attacks, both of which impacted trade flows for very different reasons.
The disaggregate nature of the data enables us to evaluate which industries experienced the most significant border effects. We are also able to condition our estimates with the use of province/state specific controls and year dummies. In other words, our dataset allows us to expand the analysis of border effects further beyond what most existing studies based on aggregate data with very limited time-series variation have managed to achieve.
A wide array of regressions based on many different empirical specifications and varying levels of aggregation not only confirm the existence of border effects in U.S.-Canada trade, but more importantly they also reveal similar trends through time in bilateral Canada-US border effects. There is a visible decrease in border effects after the enactment of NAFTA, and an upward spike up after the 9/11 attacks. While there is some heterogeneity in border effects across industries, a majority correspond with these broad trends. Those that do not, exhibit border effects which are consistent with specific institutional details. Finally, border effects are apparent for exports from Canadian provinces as well as for imports.
Our findings suggest that NAFTA did accomplish its trade facilitation objectives. However, the reduction in border effects was reversed with 9/11 which resulted in increased security and enhanced travel restrictions between Canada and the United States. The implication is that there was a loss of trade and associated costs on both sides of the border.
We believe that our results are of contemporary relevance given the current discussions between the two countries on measures designed to reduce cross-border delays and facilitate mutually beneficial trade flows. 
